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Tiebout’s classic 1956 paper has strong implications regarding stratification across and within jurisdictions,
predicting in the simplest instance a hierarchy of internally homogeneous communities ordered by
income. Typically, urban areas are less than fully stratified, and the question arises how much departures
from standard Tiebout assumptions contribute to observed within-neighborhood mixing. This paper
quantifies the separate effects on neighborhood stratification of employment geography (via costly
commuting) and preferences for housing attributes. It does so using an equilibrium sorting model,
estimated with rich Census micro-data. Simulations based on the model using credible preference
estimates show that counterfactual reductions in commuting costs lead to marked increases in racial
and education segregation and, to a lesser degree, increases in income segregation, given that households
now find it easier to locate in neighborhoods with like households. While turning off preferences for
housing characteristics increases racial segregation, especially for blacks, doing so reduces income
segregation, indicating that heterogeneity in the housing stock serves to stratify households based on
ability-to-pay. Further, we show that differences in housing also help accentuate differences in the
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Tiebout’s classic 1956 paper emphasized the efficiency of decentralized public goods provision in 
a system of local jurisdictions.  In doing so, it provided a provocative response to Samuelson’s 
seminal 1954 article, which had voiced skepticism as to the efficacy of decentralized systems for 
providing public goods.  Yet beyond its enduring relevance to the debate about public goods 
provision, Tiebout’s paper has also served as an immensely fertile starting point for economists 
interested in understanding endogenous neighborhood stratification in an urban setting, motivated 
in part by concerns that excessive segregation may have adverse welfare consequences.
1   
    Tiebout’s basic treatment was highly stylized – in his words, “extreme.”  It focused on a 
simple setting in which consumers were “fully mobile” (his Assumption 1), moving costlessly to 
their  preferred  jurisdiction  when  choosing  among  a l a r g e  n u m b e r  o f  c o m p e t i n g  j u r i s d i c t i o n s  
(Assumption 3), which differed only in the exogenous public goods and taxation packages they 
offered.  With the neighborhood segregation theme in mind, Tiebout’s stylized theory
2 has strong 
implications regarding stratification across and within jurisdictions.  For example, in the simplest 
case where households are heterogeneous only in terms of their income, a hierarchy of internally 
homogeneous communities ordered by income is predicted.   
    In practice, urban areas tend to exhibit varying degrees of within-neighborhood mixing, 
and it is natural to trace this discrepancy to departures from the standard Tiebout assumptions.
3  
The  potential  list  of  such  departures  is  long.    But  given  the  burden  in  Tiebout’s  theory  –
preferences being revealed through a process of ‘voting with feet’ – the character of household 
preferences and the role of mobility provide an obvious starting point.  In terms of the former, 
household tastes when making residential choices are likely to vary according to the household’s 
own  characteristics  (education,  income,  race  and  family  size,  for  instance),  and  this  inherent 
preference heterogeneity will tend to lead households in a given neighborhood to differ in terms 
of,  say,  income.
4  Household t a s t e s  will  also  typically  depend  on  a  whole  range  of  choice 
attributes – housing characteristics, local amenities, the characteristics of neighbors, geographic 
                                                         
1 Benabou (1993) and Cutler and Glaeser (1997) provide well-known developments of this theme. 
2 The informality of Tiebout’s original presentation has prompted an important literature seeking to place 
the rather implicit ‘theory’ on more solid foundations.  See, for instance, Bewley (1981).  
3 The development of richer theoretical models of systems of jurisdictions has been a central preoccupation 
in local public finance over the past three decades.  Notable here is the work of Epple and coauthors, who 
show in a series of papers how housing and endogenously determined public goods can be incorporated 
into rigorous multi-community equilibrium models with mobile households.   
4 On this point, Epple and Platt (1998) show theoretically that some degree of within-jurisdiction income 
mixing can arise when households are heterogeneous both in terms of income and tastes for public goods.    2 
 
convenience – rather than just different expenditure and revenue patterns across communities (as 
in Tiebout’s Assumption 2).  The distribution of housing characteristics, for example, will often 
vary markedly across a metropolitan area, given the complexity of local zoning and the durability 
of  the  housing  stock,  and  this  may  serve t o  s o r t  heterogeneous  households  into  given 
communities.    Likewise g eography:  while  Tiebout  abstracted  from  “restrictions  due  to 
employment o p p o r t u n i t i e s ,”
5  the  geographic  distribution  of  jobs c o m b i n ed w i t h  imperfect 
mobility (non-zero commuting costs) should help spread households out across the urban area 
and contribute to within-community mixing.  Simply put, households may prefer a house in a 
neighborhood close to the workplace, especially if commutes are costly, even if it means trading 
off against other attributes such as living with similar neighbors.  
    The goal of this paper is to quantify the separate effects on observed residential mixing of 
employment  geography  (via  the  disutility  of  commuting) a n d  heterogeneous  preferences  for 
housing.  Doing  so  is  of  clear  interest,  given  concerns  about  the  adverse  consequences  of 
sociodemographic  stratification  across  neighborhoods.
6  Y e t  such  quantification  is  far  from 
straightforward, not least because it requires the researcher to assess the extent of neighborhood 
stratification in a counterfactual environment.   
    One general approach to conducting such counterfactuals – and few viable alternatives 
come to mind – would start with a realistic specification of the preferences that underlie the 
existing pattern of residential sorting, and then simulate a counterfactual change in household 
preferences,  tracing t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h i s  c h a n g e  o n  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n  a n d  o t h e r  o u t c o m e s  i n  t h e  
counterfactual equilibrium.  To implement this kind of notional experiment, one would need 
credible preference estimates, along with a coherent model of the sorting process that allows 
counterfactual equilibria to be simulated.   
    In this paper, we apply an estimation-simulation approach set out in two prior papers that 
attempts to track this type of notional counterfactual exercise.  Specifically, we combine the 
equilibrium sorting model in Bayer, McMillan and Rueben (2011) and an approach to estimating 
sorting models with rich preference heterogeneity presented in Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan 
(2007) i n  o r d e r  t o  q u a n t i f y  p o s s i b l e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  r e s i d e n t i a l  s t r a t i f i c a t i o n .   Our  general 
approach builds on two strands of literature.  A large body of theoretical research, including 
papers by Epple, Filimon and Romer (1984, 1993), Epple and Romano (1996, 1998), Benabou 
                                                                                                                                                                     
In this instance, the type space is partitioned in equilibrium into a series of diagonal slices, implying that 
the across-neighborhood income hierarchy still obtains, conditioning on tastes.      
5 “Restrictions due to employment opportunities are not considered” (Tiebout’s Assumption 4).   3 
 
(1993, 1996), Anas and Kim (1996), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996, 1998), and Nechyba (1999, 
2000),  has d e v e l o p e d  equilibrium  sorting  models,  using  them  to  analyze  the  way  that 
interdependent  individual  decisions  in  the  housing  market  aggregate  up  to  determine  the 
equilibrium structure of a metropolitan area.  More recently, a related line of research has sought 
to take these models to the data.  Epple and Sieg (1999) develop an estimator for the equilibrium 
sorting model of Epple, Filimon, and Romer, providing the first unified treatment of theory and 
empirics in the literature.  In the same vein, Sieg et al. (2004) use this approach to explore the 
general equilibrium impacts of air quality improvements in the Los Angeles Basin.  And Ferreyra 
(2007) develops an estimator building on the work of Nechyba, using this to simulate the effects 
of school vouchers in an equilibrium setting. 
    By  way  of  a  quick  overview  of  the  elements  of  our  approach,  we  start  with  an 
equilibrium framework in which households choose residential locations from the set of available 
houses in the metropolitan area, given the employment locations of household heads, in order to 
maximize  their  utility.    In  terms  of  locational  preferences,  the  model  permits  a  considerable 
amount of household taste heterogeneity, with tastes being allowed to vary over a wide range of 
housing  and  neighborhood  characteristics,  including  those  that  are  endogenously  determined 
through the sorting process; tastes are also allowed to vary with a range of observable household 
characteristics.  Neighborhood residential compositions are endogenous, and house prices adjust 
to equate demand with fixed supply.  In equilibrium, no household can gain from moving and all 
local housing markets clear.    
    We estimate the sorting model using an econometric approach set out in Bayer et al. 
(2007).  This introduces unobserved neighborhood attributes into McFadden’s (1978) discrete-
choice housing demand model.  Doing so brings an important endogeneity problem to the fore, as 
prices and neighborhood compositions – key choice characteristics – are likely to be correlated 
with the neighborhood unobservables.  To address the potential endogeneity of these endogenous 
choice attributes, we develop instruments for price based on exogenous choice characteristics, 
here following Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995); and to account for the potential endogeneity 
of  school  quality  and  sorting-dependent  sociodemographics,  we  further  extend  the  boundary 
discontinuity  approach  introduced  by  Black  (1999),  making  use  of  sharp  changes  in  school 
quality and sociodemographics in the vicinity of school attendance zone boundaries.   
    In taking the model to the data, we make use of restricted-access Census microdata on a 
very large and representative sample (1-in-7) of households in the Bay Area.  The long form of 
                                                                                                                                                                     
6 It is worth adding that job location is given as the single most important factor influencing residential 
choices in the American Housing Survey, and there has been limited recent research examining the effects   4 
 
the Census provides detailed information about a wide set of household characteristics, including 
education, income, age, family structure, and race.  It also provides information about the chosen 
housing unit – its size, when built, whether owned, and more.  Because the restricted-access 
version of the Census we are using specifies residential locations down to the Census block, we 
can  merge  in  a  great  deal  of  additional  data,  relating  to  local  amenities,  land  use  and  the 
characteristics of immediate neighbors.  We can also construct a boundary sub-sample, based on 
distance to the closest school attendance zone boundary, in order to implement the boundary 
identification approach mentioned above.  Particularly valuable for our purposes is the fact that 
the restricted-access version of the Census also includes information on places of work down to 
the block.  This affords a very detailed picture of the employment geography of the metropolitan 
area, which we use to anchor household location decisions, taking place of work as given.
7    
    Estimates  of  the  model  provide  a  rich  characterization  of  heterogeneous  household 
preferences  for  a  variety  of  housing  and  neighborhood  characteristics,  including  local  public 
goods such as school quality and crime, as well as the characteristics of neighbors.  Applying the 
identification strategies just referred to yields reasonable estimates of household willingness-to-
pay for these choice attributes.  As one might expect, households with higher education levels and 
incomes are willing to pay more for better schools, as are households with children, though the 
extent  of  the  heterogeneity  in  willingness  to  pay  is  rather  muted.    While  some  choice 
characteristics are likely to be ranked similarly by all households, the rankings of others might be 
expected to vary depending on a household’s own characteristics (their race, for example).  In 
line  with  this,  we  find  evidence  of  strong  racial  interactions  in  the  utility  function,  with 
households of the same race showing a strong willingness-to-pay to live with like neighbors.   
      In combination with these rich preference estimates, our equilibrium model serves as a 
useful  device  for  exploring  the  implications  of  changes  in  model  primitives  for  residential 
stratification and household consumption levels.  In that vein, the main analysis in this paper 
consists  of  a  series  of  counterfactual  simulations  intended  to  shed  light  on  the  factors  that 
contribute in practice to observed residential mixing.  Following on from the above discussion, 
we focus on the possible effects of employment geography combined with costly commuting 
(taking a queue from Tiebout directly) and also heterogeneity in preferences for housing.  We 
explore the former by counterfactually reducing households’ estimated disutility of commuting to 
work, first cutting the estimated disutility in half and then switching it off entirely, in both cases 
while holding the distribution of employment in the study area fixed.  And we shed light on the 
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latter by counterfactually switching off household preferences for housing characteristics while 
keeping the geographic distribution of the existing housing stock fixed.   
    Our f i r s t  s e t  o f  s i m u l a t i o n s  s h o w s t h a t  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  r e d u c t i o n s  i n  the  disutility  of 
commuting lead to marked increases in racial and education segregation and, to a lesser degree, 
increases in income segregation, as households now find it easier to form neighborhoods with like 
households.    While  turning  off  preferences  for  housing  characteristics  increases  education 
segregation and racial segregation, especially for blacks, it actually reduces income segregation, 
indicating  that  the  non-uniform  distribution  of  housing  characteristics  serves  to  stratify 
households based on ability to pay.  Further, we show that differences in housing help accentuate 
differences  in  the  consumption  of  local  amenities,  our  estimates  providing  a  sense  of  the 
magnitudes involved.  
    The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows:  in  Sections  2-4,  we  provide  a  brief 
overview of the approach we apply for assessing the relevant counterfactuals.  Specifically, the 
next  section  sets  out  the  equilibrium  sorting  model  and  its  main  properties,  drawing  on  the 
comprehensive treatment in Bayer et al. (2011); the estimation of the model, based on Bayer et 
al. (2007), is described in Section 3; Section 4 describes the detailed Census microdata drawn 
from the Bay Area briefly, along with the model estimates.  Sections 5 and 6 represent the core of 
the paper, Section 5 summarizing our simulation approach and presenting benchmark measures of 
fit, and Section 6 describing results from a series of counterfactual simulations that shed light on 
the determinants of residential mixing.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2      THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
The counterfactual simulations at the heart of the paper make use of a version of the equilibrium 
residential sorting model developed in Bayer et al. (2011).  In order to provide a self-contained 
account of the relevant ingredients that feed into the simulation exercise, we begin with a brief 
outline  of  the  equilibrium  model.    This  model  combines  two  key  elements:  the h o u s e h o l d  
residential location choice problem and a market-clearing condition.  In terms of the former, 
households have heterogeneous preferences defined over housing and neighborhood attributes in 
a flexible  way.
8   The model also allows housing prices and neighborhood sociodemographic 
compositions to be determined in equilibrium, through market-clearing.   
                                                                                                                                                                     
7 I t  i s  f e a s i b l e ,  i f  mo r e  c h a l l e n g i n g ,  t o  f u r t h e r  e n d o g e n i z e  t h e  p l a c e  o f  wo r k  i n  t h e  h o u s e h o l d  c h o i c e  
process.  Doing so is beyond the scope of the current analysis. 
8 It is important to point out that this flexibility is made possible because we abstract from issues related to 
local politics.  As Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1993) note, incorporating local politics into models of   6 
 
 
The  Residential  Location  Decision.    We  model  the  residential  location  decision  of  each 
household as a discrete choice of a single residence from a set of house types available in the 
market.    To  explain  the  relevant  notation,  let  Xh r e p r e s e n t  t h e  o b s e r v a b l e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  
housing choice h, including characteristics of the house itself (e.g., the house’s age and size), its 
tenure status (whether rented or owned), and the characteristics of the surrounding neighborhood 
(e.g., local land use and topography).  We use Zh to represent the average sociodemographic 
characteristics of the corresponding neighborhood, writing this separately from the other housing 
and  neighborhood  attributes  to  make  explicit  the  fact  that  these  sociodemographics a r e  
determined in equilibrium.  Let ph denote the price of housing choice h, and let dh
i denote the 
distance from residence h to the primary work location of household i (where we take that work 
location as given).   




(1)  . 
 
The  error  structure  of  the  indirect  utility  function  is  divided  into  a  correlated  component 
associated  with  each  housing  choice  that  is  valued  the  same  by  all  households,  !h,  and  an 
individual-specific term, "
i
h, each household i drawing a vector of taste shocks, one for each 
housing type.  A useful interpretation of !h is that it captures the unobserved quality of each 
housing choice, including any unobserved quality associated with its neighborhood.  
We define a household type based on K  observable  household  characteristics.    Each 
household i’s valuation of given choice characteristics is allowed to vary with its own observable 
characteristics,  z
i,  including  education,  income,  race,  employment  status,  and  household 
composition.   S p e c i f i c a l l y ,  we  let  each  parameter  associated  with  housing  and  neighborhood 
characteristics and price, #
i
j, for j ! {X, Z, p, d}, vary with a household’s own characteristics 
according to: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
residential sorting requires restrictions to be placed on preferences in order to guarantee the existence of an 
equilibrium.  Accordingly, recent papers by Epple and Sieg (1999) and Epple, Romer and Sieg (2001) 
estimate equilibrium models that include voting over the level of public goods, restricting households to 
have shared rankings over a single public goods index.  We view our model as having a comparative rather 
than absolute advantage over the papers in that line of research, suitable for exploring research questions, 
such  as  those  related  to  segregation,  where  a  vertical  restriction  is  less  appealing,  or  for  use  in  an   7 
 
(2)  , 
 
with equation (2) describing household i’s preference for choice characteristic j.  
This specification of the utility function gives rise to a horizontal model of sorting in 
which household preferences may vary in an unrestricted way over each choice characteristic, 
including  housing  features,  commuting  distance,  school  quality  and  neighborhood 
sociodemographic characteristics.  This contrasts with vertical models, which restrict households 
to have preferences over a single locational index, thereby constraining households to have the 
same preference ordering across locations. The additional flexibility of the horizontal model is 
especially relevant for this paper as it is the magnitude of the heterogeneity in preferences for 
various locational factors (including housing and commuting distance) that will determine the 
extent of stratification across neighborhoods.  
 
Characterizing  the  Housing  Market. W e  a s s u m e  t h a t  t h e  h o u s i n g  m a r k e t  c a n  b e  f u l l y  
characterized by a set of housing types that is a subset of the full set of available houses in the 
study area, reflecting the fact that we are working with a 1-in-7 sample of the universe of houses 
in the Bay Area.  Let the supply of housing of type h be given by Sh, with all houses being 
occupied in equilibrium.  We assume that each household observed in the sample represents a 
continuum of households with the same observable characteristics;
9 accordingly, the distribution 
of idiosyncratic tastes "
i
h maps into a set of choice probabilities that characterize the distribution 
of housing choices that would result for the continuum of households with a given set of observed 
characteristics.   
Given  the  household’s  problem  described  in  equations  (1)-(2),  household  i c h o o s e s  
housing type h if the utility that it receives from this choice exceeds the utility that it receives 
from all other possible house choices – that is, when  
 




h includes all of the non-idiosyncratic components of the utility function V
i
h.  As the 
inequalities in (3) imply, the probability that a household chooses any particular choice depends 
                                                                                                                                                                     
institutional setting as in California, where Proposition 13 leaves almost no discretion over property tax 
rates or the level of public goods spending at the local level. 
9 This assumption facilitates the proof of the existence of an equilibrium in the model.   8 
 
in general on the characteristics of the full set of possible house types.  Thus the probability P
i
h 
that household i chooses housing type h can be written as a function of the full vectors of housing 
and neighborhood characteristics (both observed and unobserved) and prices, given by {X, Z, p, 




(4)  . 
 
Aggregating the probabilities in equation (4) over all observed households yields the 
predicted demand for each housing type h, Dh: 
 
(5)  . 
 
In order for the housing market to clear, the demand for houses of type h must equal the supply of 
such houses, and so: 
 
(6)  .  
 
Given the decentralized nature of the housing market, prices are assumed to adjust in order to 
clear the market.  The implications of the market clearing condition defined in equation (6) for 
prices are very standard, with excess demand for a housing type causing price to be bid up and 
excess supply leading to a fall in price.  Given the indirect utility function defined in equation (1) 
and a fixed set of housing and neighborhood attributes, Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2011) 
show that a unique set of prices (up to a scale) clears the market.  
Given that some neighborhood attributes are endogenously determined by the sorting 
process itself, we define a sorting equilibrium as a set of residential location decisions and a 
vector  of  housing  prices  such  that  the  housing  market  clears  and  each  household  makes  its 
optimal location decision given the location decisions of all other households.  In equilibrium, the 
vector of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics along with the corresponding vector of 
market-clearing prices must give rise to choice probabilities in equation (4) that aggregate back 
                                                         
10 For the purposes of characterizing the equilibrium properties of the model, we include an individual’s 
employment location in z
i and the residential location in Xh.   9 
 
up to the same vector of neighborhood sociodemographics.
11  Whether this model gives rise to 
multiple equilibria depends on the distributions of preferences and available housing choices as 
well  as  the  utility  function  parameters.    In  general,  it  is  not  possible  to  establish  that  the 
equilibrium  is  unique  a  priori.    However,  estimation  of  the  model  does  not  require  the 
computation of an equilibrium nor uniqueness more generally, as we describe in the next section.   
 
3     ESTIMATION 
 
Estimation  of  the  model  follows  a  two-stage  procedure  closely  related  to  that  in  Berry, 
Levinsohn,  and  Pakes  (1995).    This  section  outlines  the  estimation  procedure;  a  rigorous 
presentation is contained in Bayer et al. (2007).   
It is helpful in describing the estimation approach to introduce some additional notation. 
In particular, we rewrite the indirect utility function as:  
 
(7)      
where 
(8)   
and 
(9)  . 
 
In equations (7) and (8), $h captures the portion of utility provided by housing type h that is 
common to all households, and in (9), k indexes household characteristics.  When the household 
characteristics included in the model are constructed to have mean zero, $h is the mean indirect 
utility provided by housing choice h.  The unobservable component of $h, !h, captures the portion 
of unobserved preferences for housing choice h that is correlated across households, while "
i
h 
represents unobserved preferences over and above this shared component.  (In equation (8), the 
term %bh represents a vector of boundary fixed effects, described below.)  
  The  first  step  of  the  estimation  procedure  is  equivalent  to  a  Maximum  Likelihood 
estimator  applied  to  the  individual  location  decisions,  taking  prices  and  neighborhood 
                                                         
11 Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2011) establish the existence of a sorting equilibrium as long as (i) the 
indirect  utility  function s h o w n  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 )  i s  d e c r e a s i n g  i n  h o u s i n g  p r i c e s  f o r  a l l  h o u s e h o l d s ;  ( i i )    10 
 
sociodemographic compositions as given.  This returns estimates of the heterogeneous parameters 
in & and mean indirect utilities, $h.  The estimator is based simply on maximizing the probability 
that the model correctly matches each household observed in the sample with its chosen house 
type.  In particular, for any combination of the heterogeneous parameters in & and mean indirect 
utilities, $h, the model predicts the probability that each household i chooses house type h.  We 
assume  that  "h
i i s  d r a w n  f r o m  t h e  Type  1  extreme  value  distribution,  in  which  case  this 
probability can be written: 
 
(10)   
 
Maximizing the probability that each household makes its correct housing choice gives rise to the 
following quasi-log-likelihood function:  
 




h is an indicator variable that equals 1 if household i chooses house type h in the data and 
0 otherwise.  The first stage of the estimation procedure then consists of searching over the 
parameters in & and the vector of mean indirect utilities to maximize .  
 
The  Endogeneity  of  School  Quality  and  Neighborhood  Sociodemographic  Composition. 
Having  estimated  the  vector  of  mean  indirect  utilities  in  the  first  stage  of  the  estimation 
procedure,  the  second  stage  involves  decomposing  $ i n t o  o b s e r v a b l e  a n d  u n o b s e r v a b l e  
components  according  to  the  regression  equation  (8).
12 I n  e s t i m a t i n g  e q u a t i o n  ( 8 ) ,  i m p o r t a n t  
endogeneity problems need to be confronted.  First, to the extent that house prices partly capture 
house and neighborhood quality unobserved to the econometrician, so the price variable will be 
endogenous, and estimation via least squares will lead to price coefficients biased towards zero, 
producing misleading willingness-to-pay estimates for a whole range of choice characteristics. 
This issue arises in the context of any differentiated products demand estimation and we follow 
the approach described in Bayer et al. (2007) to instrument for price.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
indirect utility is a continuous function of neighborhood sociodemographic characteristics; and (iii) " is 
drawn from a continuous density function. 
12 N o t i c e  t h a t  t h e  s e t  o f  o b served  residential  choices  provides  no  information  that  distinguishes  the 
components of $.  That is, however $ is broken into components, the effect on the probabilities shown in 
equation (10) is identical.   11 
 
  A second identification issue involves the correlation of neighborhood sociodemographic 
characteristics Z and school quality with unobserved housing and neighborhood quality, !h.  To 
properly estimate preferences in the face of this endogeneity problem, we adapt an appealing 
technique previously developed by Black (1999).  Black’s strategy makes use of a sample of 
houses  near  school  attendance  zone  boundaries,  estimating  a  hedonic  price  regression  that 
includes boundary fixed effects.  Intuitively, the idea is to compare houses in the same local 
neighborhood but on opposite sides of the boundary, exploiting the discontinuity in the right to 
attend a given school.  Differences in valuation will then reflect differences in school quality, 
controlling for other neighborhood characteristics (both observed and unobserved).    
  As shown in Bayer et al. (2007), however, households clearly sort with respect to these 
boundaries.  Thus, while the boundary fixed effects are likely to control well for differences in 
unobserved fixed factors, neighborhood sociodemographics are likely to vary discontinuously at 
the boundary.  This is important: it implies that boundary fixed effects isolate variation in both 
school quality and neighborhood sociodemographics in a small region in which unobserved fixed 
features  (e.g.,  access  to  the  transportation  network)  are  likely  to  vary  only  slightly,  thereby 
providing  an  appealing  way  to  account  for  the  correlation  of  both  school  quality  and 
neighborhood sociodemographics with unobservable neighborhood quality.  The approach thus 
allows us to treat a range of local public goods as endogenous.   
  We  incorporate  school  attendance  zone  boundary  fixed  effects   w h e n  e s t i m a t i n g  
equation (8).  In particular, we create a series of indicator variables for each Census block that 
equal one if the block is within a given distance of each unique school attendance zone boundary 
in the metropolitan area.  Bayer et al. (2007) provide extensive descriptive evidence regarding the 
significant  extent  that  the  school  quality a n d  n e i g h b o r h o o d  d e m o g r a p h i c s  v a r y  a t  t h e s e  
boundaries and, important for the identification approach, the essentially continuous way that 
other housing and neighborhood attributes run through the boundary.    
 
4     DATA and ESTIMATES 
 
The analysis uses restricted-access Census data from 1990 that combine the detailed individual, 
household, and housing variables found in the public-use version of the Census with information 
about the location of individual residences and workplaces at a very disaggregate level.  We use 
data from six contiguous counties in the San Francisco Bay Area: Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, 
San Mateo, San Francisco, and Santa Clara – a sample of 242,100 households drawn from over 
39,000 Census blocks.     12 
 
The  Census  provides  a  wealth  of d a t a  o n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l s  i n  t h e  s a m p l e  – r a c e ,  a g e ,  
educational attainment, income from various sources, household size and structure, occupation, 
and employment location.  In addition, it provides a variety of housing characteristics: whether 
the unit is owned or rented, the corresponding rent or owner-reported value, number of rooms, 
number  of  bedrooms,  type  of  structure,  and  the  age  of  the  building.  We  use  these  housing 
characteristics directly, and also construct neighborhood variables, such as neighborhood racial, 
education and income distributions, based on the households within the same Census block group 
(a  Census  region  containing  approximately  500  housing  units).  We  merge  additional  data 
describing local conditions with each house record, constructing variables related to crime rates, 
land use, local schools, topography, and urban density.  The list of the principal housing and 
neighborhood variables used in the analysis, along with means and standard deviations, is given 
in the first two columns of Table 1.
13 
 
School Boundaries. In order to implement the boundary discontinuity design, we gathered school 
attendance zone maps for as many elementary schools as possible in the Bay Area, for the period 
around the 1990 Census.  Our final attendance zone sample consists of 195 elementary schools – 
just under a third of the total number in the Bay Area.  From this boundary sample, we excluded 
portions of boundaries coinciding with school district boundaries, city boundaries, or large roads, 
since they could potentially confound our identification strategy. 
For our main boundary analysis, we focus on houses in all Census blocks that are within 
0.20 miles of the closest school attendance zone boundary.  The average distance to the boundary 
for  this  subsample  is  thus  quite  a  lot  smaller  than  0.20  miles.    For  comparison ( r e s u l t s  n o t  
reported here), we also analyzed a further subsample, consisting of houses assigned to Census 
blocks  within  0.10  miles  of  the  closest  attendance  zone  boundary.    Although  the  0.10-mile 
subsample  includes  approximately  half  the  number  of  observations,  it  provides  a  closer 
approximation to the ideal comparison of houses on the opposite sides of the same street, though 
in separate attendance zones.  Results applying this tighter sample are very similar, if somewhat 
less precise. 
  Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for various samples related to the boundaries. The 
first two columns report means and standard deviations for the full sample while the third column 
reports means for the sample of houses within 0.2 miles of the closest school attendance zone 
                                                         
13 For each of these measures, a detailed description of the process by which the original data were assigned 
to each house is provided in the Data Appendix to Bayer et al. (2007).     13 
 
boundaries.
14  Comparing the first column to the third column of the table, the houses near school 
attendance zone boundaries are reasonably representative of those in the Bay Area as a whole.  
The fourth and fifth columns report means for houses within 0.2 miles of a boundary, comparing 
houses on the high versus low average test score side of the each boundary; the seventh column 
reporting associated t-tests for the difference in means.  Comparing these differences reveals that 
houses on the high side cost $18,700 more (on a mean of $250,000) and are assigned to schools 
with test scores that are 74 points higher on average.  Moreover, houses on the high quality side 
of the boundary are more likely to be inhabited by white households and households with more 
education  and  income.  These  types  of  across-boundary  differences  in  sociodemographic 
composition are what one would expect if households sort on the basis of preferences for school 
quality.  Given that other housing characteristics are reasonably smooth across these boundaries, 
we  expect  the  use  of  boundary  fixed  effects  to  control w e l l  f o r  m u c h  o f  t h e  v a r i a t i o n  i n  
unobserved housing and neighborhood quality i n t he boundary regi on,  thereby  giving  rise  to 
accurate estimates of mean preferences for neighborhood sociodemographics and school quality.  
We now turn to the complete set of preference estimates.  
 
Preference Estimates 
  The estimation of the full model returns over 150 parameter estimates that characterize 
heterogeneous  household  preferences  for  housing  and  neighborhood  attributes  as  well  as 
commuting distance.  While we presented some aspects of these parameter estimates in Bayer et 
al. (2007), the focus of that paper was more narrowly on the impact of including boundary fixed 
effects on the estimates of preferences for school quality and neighborhood demographics.
15  A 
much richer set of parameters is relevant for this paper, however, as the counterfactuals that we 
conduct  below  consider  the  effects o f  e m p l o y m e n t  g e o g r a p h y  a n d  h e t e r o g e n e o u s  h o u s i n g  
preferences on the extent of residential stratification.  To that end, we present a much broader set 
of parameter estimates here.  Accordingly, Table 2 reports estimates of mean preferences for key 
housing and neighborhood characteristics for two specifications of equation (8).  In estimating 
equation (8), we report results here for a specification that restricts the sample to houses within 
0.2 miles of boundaries.
16   
                                                         
14 Table 1 is taken directly from Bayer et al. (2007).  We provide it here to make the current description of 
the approach self-contained.  
15 In Bayer et al. (2007), we provide a detailed discussion of the impact of instrumenting for price.  Doing 
so  is  essential  in  order  for  the  willingness-to-pay  estimates    to  be  reasonable.    Otherwise,  the  price 
coefficient tends to be biased towards zero, inflating all WTP measures.    
16 We show in Bayer et al. (2007) that these results are robust to changes in the distance that is used, 
reporting, for example, a series of results for 0.1 mile boundaries.   14 
 
The  second  column  shows  the  impact  of  including  boundary  fixed  effects  on  the 
estimates of mean preferences.  Comparing these columns reveals a pattern of results that one 
would expect if boundary fixed effects control in part for unobserved neighborhood quality and 
unobserved  quality  is  positively  correlated  with  neighborhood  income  and  education  and 
negatively correlated with the fraction of non-white households.  Key parameter estimates include 
a  marginal  willingness-to-pay  (MWTP) o f  j u s t  u n d e r  $ 1 0 0  per  month  for  newly  constructed 
housing (relative to older housing) and for each additional room and just over $50 per month for 
avoiding each additional mile of commuting distance.
17   
Given our subsequent simulation exercises, it is important that housing preferences and 
the  disutility  of  commutes  be  credibility  identified.    While  we  do  not  develop  tailor-made 
identification strategies for these two sets of preference parameters, we would argue that the 
relevant parameter estimates are reasonable, for three main reasons: First, our very rich restricted-
access Census data provide us with a wealth of information, in this case on housing features for a 
very large sample (1-in-7) of all housing units in the Bay Area, and also very detailed information 
about actual commutes for a very large sample of workers.  There is no equivalent micro data set 
with the same coverage.  Second, the detailed geographic information allows us to apply two 
identification  approaches  that  help  account  for  the  endogeneity  of  confounding  local 
unobservables, likely to be a concern for estimates of housing characteristics and commuting, 
among other attributes.  In this respect, our estimates are an improvement on prior estimates in 
the literature.  Third, our choice model allows us to go beyond hedonic estimates that ignore 
heterogeneity, based on the revealed pattern of choices by a huge sample of households in our 
data set. 
Following on from that point, Table 3 reports the implied estimates of the heterogeneity 
in  MWTP  for  a  wide  variety  of  housing  and  neighborhood  attributes  for  our  preferred 
specification, which includes boundary fixed effects.
  The estimates of the heterogeneity in the 
MWTP  for  neighborhood  sociodemographic  characteristics  reveal  that w h i l e  a l l  h o u s e h o l d s  
prefer to live in higher-income neighborhoods, conditional on neighborhood income households 
prefer to self-segregate on the basis of both race and education.  In particular, the estimates imply 
that college-educated households are willing to pay $58 per month more than those without a 
                                                         
17 That the estimated cost of commuting increases with the inclusion of boundary fixed effects (BFEs) is 
driven by the fact that this estimate is very sensitive to the estimated mean price coefficient, which roughly 
doubles in magnitude when boundary fixed effects are included.  In general, the price coefficient is biased 
upwards (less negative than it should be) because price is positively correlated with unobserved quality.  
That the price coefficient becomes significantly more negative with the inclusion of BFEs is likely due to 
the fact that the BFEs help deal with some residual correlation of the price instruments and unobserved 
neighborhood quality.    15 
 
college degree to live in a neighborhood that has 10 percent more college-educated households.  
When combined with the estimated mean MWTP of $10 per month reported in the first row, this 
estimate implies that households at each level of educational attainment prefer neighbors with 
like education levels: while college-educated households would pay an addition $32 per month to 
live  in  a  neighborhood  that  had  10  percent  more  college-educated  households,  households 
without a college degree would actually need compensating to live in a neighborhood with 10 
percent more college-educated neighbors, to the tune of $26 per month.  
Similarly, the heterogeneity estimates imply that blacks are willing to pay $98 more per 
month  than  whites  to  live  in  a  neighborhood  that  has  10  percent  more  black  versus  white 
households.   The mean MWTP for such an increase is -$10.5 per month, primarily reflecting the 
negative valuation of the white majority.  Thus $98 is the difference between the positive MWTP 
of black households for this change and the negative MWTP of white households, indicating that 
households have strong self-segregating racial preferences.
18 
      In  contrast  to  education  and  race,  neighborhood  income  is  a  normal  good  for  all 
households, perhaps in part because higher income neighborhoods are better able to maintain 
their properties.  Not surprisingly, households with children have stronger preferences for larger 
and older houses as well as higher quality schools and the demand for owner-occupancy increases 
sharply  with  income, education  and  for  white  and  especially  Asian  households.
19  Th e  l a t t e r  
results are likely due in large part to the relative wealth of white and Asian households compared 
to that of their black and Hispanic counterparts.  
 
5      SIMULATION PRELIMINARIES 
 
Having laid out the necessary background to the simulation approach (the  model,  estimation 
procedure,  data  and  preference  estimates),  we  now  turn  to  the  simulations  that  make  up  the 
                                                         
18 It is also important to point out that these interactions pick up any direct preferences for living near 
others of the same race (e.g., a recent immigrant from China may want to interact with neighbors who also 
have immigrated from China) as well as any unobservable neighborhood or housing amenities valued more 
strongly by households of this group (e.g., recent immigrants from China may have similar tastes for shops, 
restaurants, and other neighborhood amenities). 
19 That the mean and heterogeneity in estimated willingness to pay is small for school quality relative to 
neighborhood  socioeconomic  characteristics  such  as  education  and  income  may  reflect  the  fact  that 
households face a difficult identification problem when attempting to distinguish the value added by a 
school from its socioeconomic distribution.  Given the correlation of the published average test scores with 
socioeconomic characteristics, these scores may do little more than serve as a signal of the underlying 
socioeconomic composition of the school and neighborhood.  It may also be that much of what households 
and parents are really willing to pay for when they speak about paying for better schools is the increased 
education and income of the peer group in the local school and neighborhood.     16 
 
paper’s primary contribution.  We begin this section by describing our simulation procedure, 
before discussing the construction of the exposure rate and consumption measures that constitute 
the model output.  We then compare results from the benchmark (‘pre-experiment’) simulations 
with the sample t o pr ovi de  a n i ndi c a t i on of  mode l  f i t .    The  results  from  the  pre-experiment 
benchmarks  also  serve  as  a  useful  point  of  comparison  when  assessing  the  counterfactual 
simulation results in the next section.   
 
Simulation Procedure 
The basic structure of the computation of a new equilibrium consists of a ‘price’ loop 
within a larger ‘sociodemographics’ loop.  Having changed some primitive in the model, we first 
calculate a new set of prices that clears the market.  Here, Berry (1994) ensures that there is such 
a unique set of market-clearing prices (up to scale); in addition, Berry et al. (1995) provide a 
quick means of computing the market-clearing price vector.   
We  then  take  the n e w  p r i c e s  a n d  t h e  i n i t i a l  s o c i o d e m o g r a p h i c  c o m p o s i t i o n s o f  e a c h  
neighborhood and go on to calculate the probability that each household chooses each housing 
type.  Aggregating these choices to the neighborhood level, we also compute the corresponding 
predicted  sociodemographic  composition  of  each  neighborhood.    We  then  replace  the  initial 
neighborhood sociodemographic compositions with these new measures and start the price loop 
again,  calculating a  n e w  s e t  o f  m a r k e t  c l e a r i n g  p r i c e s  given  these  updated  neighborhood 
sociodemographic  measures.    We  continue  this  process  until  the  neighborhood 
sociodemographics  converge.
20 T h e  h o u s e h o l d  l o c a t i o n  d e c i s i o n s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  t o  t h e  f i n a l  
sociodemographic measures, along with the vector of housing prices that clears the market, then 
constitute the new equilibrium, based on which we construct a variety of predicted segregation 
and consumption measures.  
 
Pre-experiment Benchmark and Sample 
As  noted a b o v e ,  e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  n o t  c o m p u t e d  d u r i n g  t h e  e s t i m a t i o n  p r o c e s s .   This  is 
important for the feasibility of our estimator, given that the class of models that ours falls into do 
not have generically unique equilibria.  This point also matters from the perspective of carrying 
out simulations.  Specifically, it is unlikely that the prices and neighborhood compositions seen in 
the  data  constitute  an  equilibrium  in  the  context  of  our  sorting  model,  given  the  preference 
                                                         
20 In one variant of the simulation code, we allow school quality and crime rates to adjust further in light of 
changing local demographics, allowing for further compounding.  In the simulation results reported in this 
paper, we close down this channel of adjustment.  We view this as a conservative choice that will lead us to 
understate the effects of changes in primitives on stratification.   17 
 
estimates we recover – this is something we are able to check computationally.  For the purposes 
of carrying out simulations, it is therefore useful to start from a comparable benchmark in order to 
provide an appropriate comparison with subsequent counterfactuals.
21  To this end, we take the 
full set of model estimates and the simple structure of the equilibrium model, and slightly perturb 
tastes,  say,  over  commuting.    This  sets  in  motion  changes  in  market-clearing  prices  and 
neighborhood  compositions  until  a  corresponding e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  f o u n d ,  which  – i n  many 
instances – is close to the non-equilibrium predictions of the estimated model.
22   
Based on this ‘pre-experiment’ equilibrium, it is straightforward to compute predicted 
measures of neighborhood stratification and the consumption of amenities for households with 
given sociodemographic characteristics; and these can be compared to the corresponding sample 
measures, as well as segregation and consumption measures predicted by the model directly, 
without imposing any equilibrium requirement.
23  The presentation of the results from the ‘pre-
experiment’  benchmark  follows  the  same  format  as  the  results  from  the  counterfactual 
simulations, so it is worth commenting on the general structure: for each equilibrium, we compute 
exposure rate measures of neighborhood segregation and predicted consumption measures for 
housing and neighborhood amenities, separately for households depending on their education, 
income, and race.
24  We now describe the construction of these measures.   
For our education categorization, we assign households to three exhaustive, mutually 
exclusive categories, based on the educational attainment of the household head: high school or 
less, some college, and college degree or more.  For income, we simply assign households to one 
of the four income quartiles, where the relevant cutoffs are set based on the sample income 
distribution.  A n d  f o r  r a c e ,  w e  c a t e g o r i z e  h o u s e h o l d s  i n t o  o n e  o f  t h r e e  m u t u a l l y  e x c l u s i v e ,  
exhaustive racial groups, again based on the reported race of the household head – white, black 
and ‘other’ races (defined as non-white and non-black, combining Asians, Hispanics, and native 
Americans).  In contrast to education and income, which have the character of vertical attributes, 
                                                         
21 We note that multiplicity arises because of the presence of social interactions in the utility function – that 
is,  the  potential  dependence  of  household  tastes  on  the  characteristics o f  n e i g h b o r s .   N o n e  o f  t h e  
simulations  we  report  involve  shutting  down  these  interactions,  and  so  there  is  no  guarantee  that  the 
counterfactual equilibria that we describe are unique.     
22 On the multiplicity point, we have experimented with perturbing the model by adding noise to covariates 
to see whether the equilibria that emerge are markedly different.  We find that they are not.  Based on these 
robustness exercises, multiplicity appears not to be a major concern, which we attribute to the high degree 
of smoothness in the model.    
23 We do not report segregation and consumption measures based on these simple model predictions here.  
For the most part, they are very close to the corresponding sample quantities, consistent with the close fit of 
the econometric model to the data. 
24 We also computed segregation as well as ‘amenity’ consumption measures on the basis of household 
education (whether the household head has a college degree or not) combined with an indicator denoting 
children present in the household – thus 2! 2 categories.  These results are available upon request.   18 
 
race introduces potentially interesting heterogeneity in household choices across race, which we 
will examine below.  
Exposure rates provide intuitive measures of the degree of neighborhood stratification (in 
this  application,  at  the  block  group  level)  faced  by  households  in  a  particular  cell,  whether 
defined by education, income or race.  Take, for instance, a given household in a given education 
cell.  Based on the model predictions, the probability mass associated with that household is 
spread  over  housing  units  in  the  sample,  and  it  is  possible  to  construct  the  implied 
sociodemographic  (in  this  case,  educational)  composition  of  each  neighborhood  that  the 
household  is  associated  with,  having  netted  out  the  probability  mass  associated  with  the 
household’s own presence.  Averaging these predicted neighborhood compositions, using the 
household’s probabilities across neighborhoods as weights, it is possible to form the predicted 
average neighborhood compositions for the given household, based on the full set of choices in 
the choice set.  In turn, we can average across all like households – for instance, households in the 
bottom education category – to determine the education exposure rates for households in that 
category.  We construct analogous exposure rates for households with some college or a college 
degree, and separately, on the basis of household income and race. 
For comparison, we also construct sample exposure rate measures, separately on the basis 
of education and income and race.  Here, for our sample education exposure rates, we simply 
record the block group neighborhood education composition for a household in a given category, 
then  average  the  neighborhood  compositions  over  all  like  households.    Both  for  the  pre-
experiment  and t h e  s a m p l e ,  w e  o b t a i n  m e a s u r e s  o f  t h e  a v e r a g e  n e i g h b o r h o o d  e d u c a t i o n  
compositions that households in each education category are exposed to, giving a total of nine 
exposure  rates.    These  are  arranged  in  columns  of  three,  each  column  corresponding  to  the 
education compositions – either predicted or sample – for households falling into the education 
category denoted by the column heading.  In the corresponding case of income, the relevant 
matrix of income quartile exposure rates – again, either predicted or sample – consists of 16 
numbers, in four columns of four.  For race, the relevant exposure rate matrices each have nine 
elements – three individual race categories by three neighborhood racial proportions.      
Table 4 shows education exposure rates for the sample (uppermost panel) and the pre-
experiment predictions (bottom panel), with Table 5 showing corresponding income exposure 
rates, and Table 6 showing racial exposure rates.  To be clear about how one should read the 
tables, the top panel of Table 4 shows sample education exposure rates.  The top left-most entry, 
0.431,  indicates  that  in  the  sample,  the  typical  household  with  no  more  than  a  high  school 
education is found in a neighborhood (here, a census block group) in which 43.1 percent of   19 
 
households h a s  n o  mo r e  t h a n  a  h i g h  s c h o o l  e d u c a t i o n .   Lo o k i n g  d o wn  t h e  f i r s t  c o l u mn ,  t h e  
remainder  of  the  typical  neighbors  that  less  educated  households  are  exposed  to  consists o f  
households  with  some  college  (22.5  percent),  and  households  with  a  college  degree  (34.4 
percent).  The column entries necessarily sum to one.   
The middle panel in the table gives the overall education distribution for the sample for 
comparison: 33.8 percent of households have at most a high school education, 22.3 percent have 
some college, and 43.8 percent have a college degree or more.  It is clear that there is some 
degree of education segregation in the Bay Area sample, at least at the top and bottom ends of the 
education spectrum, with households tending to locate in neighborhoods where more households 
of their own education level are found, relative to the no-stratification case in which the education 
composition of all neighborhoods simply equaled the overall sample proportions.  Thus, highly 
educated  households  are,  on  average,  located  in  neighborhoods  that  are  51.8  percent  highly 
educated (i.e. in the top education category), as opposed to 43.8 percent highly educated if there 
was ‘even spreading.’  This sample over-exposure comes at the expense of households in the two 
lower education categories, but especially households in the bottom education category (26.6 
percent average exposure in contrast to the overall 33.8 percent).  At the same time, it is worth 
noting that there is far from complete education stratification in the sample.  Households in each 
education category tend to be found in neighborhoods that have reasonably high proportions of 
households in the other two categories.     
A similar general pattern emerges for the sample income exposure rates.  Looking at the 
top panel of Table 5, even income spreading would imply that all cell entries equaled 25 percent.  
Yet the largest numbers in each column are all found on the main diagonal of the 4-by-4 sample 
exposure rate matrix.  And for households in the top income quartile, for instance, they are on 
average exposed to 37.2 rather than 25 percent highly educated neighbors; similar own-quartile 
over-exposure is apparent for households in the bottom quartile.  
Turning to race, the top panel of Table 6 shows sample segregation measures for each of 
the three racial groups.  The first column of that panel indicates that the typical white household 
lives in a neighborhood (census block group) that is 76 percent white, 4 percent black, and just 
under 20 percent ‘other’ race.  Given that the Bay Area as a whole consists of around 69 percent 
white  households,  just  under  8  percent  black,  and  around  24  percent  other  (see  the  overall 
proportions in the middle panel), there is clear descriptive evidence of racial segregation on the 
part of white households: whites are over-exposed to other whites and under-exposed to other 
racial  groups,  relative  to  the  case  where  racial  groups  were  evenly  distributed  across  all 
neighborhoods.  The same is true for blacks, apparent from the second column in the top panel:   20 
 
the typical black household in the Bay Area is greatly over-exposed to other blacks (by a factor of 
almost  five)  relative  to  even  spreading,  somewhat  over-exposed  to  the  ‘other’  category,  and 
greatly under-exposed to whites.   
    It is instructive, from the point of view of gauging model fit, to compare our sample 
exposure rates on the basis of education, income and race with the equilibrium exposure rates 
corresponding  to  a  slight  perturbation  of  household  tastes.    (As  noted  above,  the  straight 
predictions from the choice model, ignoring equilibrium considerations, are for the most part very 
close to the sample exposure rates.)  In the case of education, given in the bottom panel of Table 
4, the implied exposure rates exhibit somewhat greater ‘own-type’ stratification than the sample, 
especially at the top end.  This may reflect the strong education interactions we estimate in the 
utility function, with highly educated households willing to pay relatively large amounts to live 
with similar highly educated households.  Of note, this over-exposure pattern is not apparent for 
our  income  quartile  exposure  rate  predictions ( s e e  T a b l e  5 ) .    That  is,  the  pre-experiment 
predictions for income are really rather similar to the sample, except at the very bottom end; and 
further,  the  predicted  income  segregation  measures  exhibit  somewhat  lower  ‘own-cell’ 
stratification than the sample itself, rather than higher in the case of education.  Comparing the 
sample to the pre-experiment predictions on the basis of race in Table 6, the own-race exposure 
rates for blacks and whites are similar, though the predictions are around 10 percent higher than 
the sample in either case.  Conversely, the model somewhat under-predicts exposure of whites to 
blacks  (and  vice-versa) r e lative  to  the  sample.  T h i s  m a y  b e  d u e  t o  t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  r a c i a l  
interactions that we find in the utility function, leading to compounding effects when computing 
the pre-experiment equilibria: on this note, the corresponding non-equilibrium predictions of the 
choice model are closer to the sample for each cell.   
We also report sample and predicted consumption measures based on the same household 
categorization – separately for three education categories, four income quartile categories, and 
three racial groups.  The sample consumption measures, for housing (whether owned, and number 
of rooms) and local amenities (school quality and crime), are computed simply by averaging 
housing consumption and amenity levels over all households in a given cell, based on education 
or  income  quartile.    In  contrast,  the  predicted  consumption  measures  use  the  equilibrium 
probabilities that spread households over the different choices in the choice set, from which we 
construct weighted-average consumption measures for households in a given education group or 
income quartile. 
    Considering first the sample consumption measures by education (see panel (1) of Table 
10), ownership rates and houses sizes are all increasing in the education of the household head, as   21 
 
one might expect.  For instance, while households with ‘some college’ have average ownership 
rates just over 55 percent, households with a college degree or more have ownership rates over 65 
percent.  There is a similar positive gradient in terms of school quality (as measured by average 
test scores), increasing from a score around 505 for the lowest to around 547 for the highest 
education group.  And crime rates decline by about 35 percent on average, moving from the 
lowest to the most highly educated households. 
    The sample consumption measures by income quartile, shown in the top panel of Table 
11,  show  a  similar  pattern,  though  the  gradients  tend  to  be  steeper:
25 h o u s e h o l d s  i n  t h e  t o p  
quartile have ownership rates of around 85 percent, contrasting sharply with households in the 
bottom quartile, whose ownership rates are well under half that (just over 37 percent); and house 
sizes are around 60 percent larger, comparing bottom to top quartile.  School quality exhibits a 
similar positive gradient, and the crime rate declines steeply, by almost 60 percent, moving from 
the bottom to the top income quartile. 
    Table 12 reports consumption measures by race, the top panel showing sample measures.  
This makes clear the striking across-race differences found in practice in the consumption of 
housing and neighborhood attributes.  In terms of housing, ownership rates for whites are over 50 
percent higher than for blacks, with ‘other’ races in the middle; and whites on average live in 
houses that have 0.8 of an additional room than both blacks and other races.  The school quality 
differences by race are substantial: whites live in neighborhoods with public schools that score an 
average of 15 percent higher than blacks (8 percent higher than blacks for the other races).  And 
the crime rates faced by blacks are almost three times as high as those faced by whites, and 
almost twice as high as those for other races. 
    Comparing sample with the pre-experiment consumption predictions – the top two panels 
of Table 10 (for education), Table 11 (for income quartiles) and Table 12 (for racial groups) – it 
is clear that the overall fit is very close indeed.  It tends to be especially close for the housing 
characteristics (ownership rates and number of rooms), reasonably close for test scores, and close 
for crime if we look at income quartiles.  In terms of household education, the predicted crime 
pattern shows a slight upturn not apparent in the sample, and the predicted consumption profile 
for  school  quality  is  slightly  flatter  than  in  the  sample;  and f o r  r a c e ,  t h e r e  i s  a  m i l d  o v e r -
prediction  of  the  crime  rate  faced  by  whites.  O f  t h e  c h o i c e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  w e  i n c l u d e ,  
neighborhood crime is almost certainly measured with the most error. 
 
                                                         
25 Part of this is mechanical, as there are four, not three, categories.   22 
 
6      COUNTERFACTUAL SIMULATIONS 
 
In this section, we present the main results from a set of counterfactual simulations designed to 
shed  light  on  the  role  of  preferences  for  commutes  and  housing  in  shaping  the  extent  of 
neighborhood  sociodemographic  mixing.  W e  t a k e  t h e  p r e -experiment  exposure  rates  and 
consumption measures by education, income and race discussed in the previous section as our 
benchmarks, then examine the resulting counterfactual changes in segregation and consumption 
measures by education, income and race associated with each experiment.  The goal in each case 
is to shed light on the relative importance of factors that may in practice contribute to residential 
mixing, apparent from the size of the changes compared to the benchmark.
26 
 
Counterfactual Simulations – Commuting   
    As we noted in the Introduction, employment considerations are abstracted from in the 
Tiebout model: everyone lives on dividend income.  Further, households are assumed to be fully 
mobile, which can be taken to mean that moving costs are zero (in a dynamic setting), as are 
commuting  costs.    In  practice,  employment  considerations  play  an  important  role  in  the 
residential choice decision, especially given that commuting is costly.    
    One  way  of  capturing  the  impact  of  ‘employment  geography’  on  neighborhood 
stratification within our static framework involves scaling the parameters on commuting distance 
counterfactually.  In our model, we condition on the place of work of the primary worker in the 
household,
27 and are able to measure distance to work very accurately using the restricted version 
of  the  Census.  T h e  w i l l i n g n e s s -to-pay  estimates  we  obtain  for  commuting  distance  indicate 
strong disutility associated with commutes, these estimates including the financial costs of travel 
in addition to the time and psychic costs, especially in the presence of congestion.  And the 
distaste for long commutes on average is likely to bring households closer to their primary places 
of work in equilibrium, with possible implications for neighborhood stratification.    
    To examine these quantitatively, we begin with two experiments that adjust tastes over 
commuting.  In the econometric model, household preferences over commuting distance (the 
distance between each housing choice and the place of work of the household head) are allowed 
to vary with observable household characteristics, including their education, income, race, age, 
                                                         
26 I n  i n t e r p r e t i n g  t h e  m a g n i t u d e s  o f  t h e  c o u n t e r f a c t u a l  s i m u l a t i o n  r e s u l t s ,  a  r e v i e w e r  n o t e d  t h a t  o u r  
abstracting from moving costs will tend to lead us to overstate the full impacts of counterfactual changes.  
To do full justice to that issue would require the specification and estimation of a dynamic equilibrium 
model, beyond the scope of the current study.   23 
 
and  family  structure.    The  first  experiment  takes  our  taste  estimates,  which  measure 
heterogeneous disutility of commuting, and reduces them by 50 percent.  The second experiment 
is more extreme, switching off any disutility of commuting entirely.  This second experiment is 
akin to removing geographic considerations from the residential decision process, aside from the 




Neighborhood Stratification. We start by examining counterfactual education exposure rates, 
comparing the predicted stratification from the two commuting experiments (panels (2) and (3) of 
Table  7)  against  the  pre-experiment b e n c h m a r k  ( the  top  panel  of  Table  7).    It  is  clear  that 
education stratification increases in both of the counterfactual simulations relative to the pre-
experiment case, evident in the increase in the entries on the main diagonals of the second and 
third panels.  For instance, the exposure of households in the top education category (‘college 
degree’) to like households increases by around 11 percent when commuting disutilities are cut in 
half, and by a further 7 percent when they are switched off entirely – the top education category 
accounts for 43 percent of the sample.  There is also a slight tendency for those increases to come 
more at the expense of the bottom, rather than the middle, education category, consistent with 
there  being  increased  educational  stratification.    In  terms  of  the  magnitudes  of  the  changes, 
proportionately larger effects also occur for the bottom education category (‘high school or less,’ 
34 percent of the sample) when moving from the pre-experiment to the counterfactual that cuts 
commuting disutilities by half, relative to the change between pre-experiment and switching off 
commuting disutilities entirely.  For the middle category (‘some college’), which accounts for 
around a fifth of the sample, the effects are smaller and approximately linear.    
    Considering counterfactual income exposure rates (see the top three panels of Table 8), 
there  is  a  similar  qualitative  pattern:  the  increases  in  segregation  are  larger  at  the  extremes 
(especially the top) of the distribution and smaller in the middle; and the increased segregation 
appears to come most at the expense of the income category furthest away.  It is interesting to 
note, though, that the changes in income stratification are more muted – for instance, own-income 
segregation  increasing  by  5.4  and  7.6  percent,  respectively,  relative  to  the  benchmark f o r  
households in the top income quartile. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
27 A more general treatment would endogenize choice of workplace, and also firm locations.  Doing so is 
beyond the scope of the current analysis. 
28 Additional counterfactual experiments come to mind.  In Bayer et al. (2011), for example, we explore the 
consequences of racial sorting through counterfactual changes in race preferences.   24 
 
    The counterfactual changes in racial exposure rates associated with the two commuting 
experiments are apparent from the top three panels of Table 9.  Again, reducing the disutility of 
commutes leads to increased segregation, and the effects are non-linear, the larger proportionate 
increases  relative  to  the  baseline  coming  from  the  experiment  that  cuts  the  disutility  of 
commuting in half, rather than switching it of entirely.  Of note, the counterfactual increases in 
segregation appear to be more marked for blacks than whites.  For example, cutting commuting 
disutilities  in  half  is  predicted  to  raise  black  exposure  to  other  blacks  by  over  9  percent,  in 
contrast to the 2.4 percent increase in terms of white exposure to other whites.     
 
Consumption.  The consumption patterns are shown in panels (2) – (4) of Tables 10, 11 and 12 
for  education,  income  and  race  measures, r e s p e c tively.    Starting  with  education,  there  are 
essentially no effects on the consumption of housing characteristics across different education 
categories.  For neighborhood attributes, the consumption gradients for crime and school quality 
become  slightly s t e eper,  with  consumption  of  amenities  rising  slightly  for  the  most  highly 
educated households, falling slightly for the middle education group, and falling proportionately 
more for the bottom education category.  This indicates that more highly educated households 
find it easier to sort into neighborhoods providing better amenities when commuting costs fall, 
the reverse being true for the lowest educated (partly because of fixity of supply overall).  In 
terms of income, again the commuting experiments have relatively minor effects on housing 
consumption (there are very slight increases in housing consumption at the top end, for instance), 
changes in consumption of school quality are barely perceptible, and there is only a very slight 
increase in the crime gradient, which again steepens.  For race, we see more noticeable changes 
on the housing consumption side, at least for blacks, whose ownership rates increase slightly 
along  with  house  size.    At  the  same  time,  blacks  appear  to  be  moving  into  lower  crime 
neighborhoods w h e n  t h e  d i s u t i l i t y  o f  c o m m u t e s  f a l l s .  T h e r e  i s  l i t t l e  i m p a c t  o n  t h e  h o u s i n g  
consumption of whites, though exposure to crime declines as the disutility of commuting falls.  
As one might expect, commuting distances do increase overall (results not reported in the tables), 
by about 50 percent overall relative to the pre-experiment levels when commuting disutilities are 
halved, and by around 100 percent when they cease to matter at all. 
     In  sum,  the  two  commuting  experiments  indicate  that  reducing  the  importance  of 
commuting  in  the  household  location  decision  results  in  monotonic  but  successively  smaller 
increases in stratification on the basis of education, income and race.
29  Commuting distance 
                                                         
29 Even with the elimination of commuting costs and housing preferences from the model, there are still a 
number  of  factors  that  give  rise  to  heterogeneous  preferences  that  prevent  perfect  neighborhood   25 
 
increases  across  the  board,  and  consumption  of  local  amenities  tends  to  increase  for  highly 
educated households and decline for other education groups; the changes when broken down by 
income are slight, as are the changes on the basis of race.  Of note, even if commuting ceased to 
matter in the utility function at all, our counterfactuals suggest that there would still be a good 
deal  of  within-neighborhood  mixing  on  the  basis  of  each  of  these  key  sociodemographic 
characteristics,  which  is  just  to  say  that  other  factors  in  the  model  still  serve  to  bring 
heterogeneous households together in given neighborhoods.  Accordingly, our next experiment 
looks at the role of housing. 
 
Counterfactual Simulations – Housing   
    Housing  did  not  play a n  e x p l i c i t  r o l e  i n  T i e b o u t ’ s  o r i g i n a l  f o r m u l a t i o n ,  t h o u g h  
subsequent research (see, for instance, the contributions of Oates and Hamilton) has made good 
this deficit.  Analogous to the heterogeneous preferences over commuting distance, our sorting 
model interacts observable household characteristics with observed features of the housing stock 
(including  the  house  price,  whether  owned,  and  house  size).    In  our  third  counterfactual 
simulation,  we  switch  off  these  heterogeneous  housing  preferences  entirely.  And  again,  we 
consider the associated effects on education, income and racial stratification as well as household 
consumption  patterns,  disaggregated  separately  by  household  education  category, i n c o m e  
quartile, and race. 
 
Stratification.  In terms of stratification, this counterfactual experiment leads to increases in 
education  segregation  (see  Table  7)  that  are  remarkably  similar  to  the  effects  of  the  first 
commuting experiment (that cut the disutility of commutes in half).  This makes clear that the 
existing distribution of housing serves to integrate households on the basis of education to quite a 
sizeable degree.  In marked contrast, switching off housing preferences leads to reductions in 
income  stratification ( p a n e l  ( 4 )  o f  T a b l e  8 ) ,  producing  reductions i n  o w n -quartile  income 
segregation across the board.  This shows that the differential affordability of larger housing 
serves to segregate households on the basis of income: our computations give us a sense of how 
much by.  (At the bottom of the income distribution, for example, own-income segregation is 
predicted to fall by 3.8 percent: at the top, it is predicted to fall by a full 8 percent.)  More 
                                                                                                                                                                     
stratification.  The model continues to include heterogeneous preferences for neighborhood and housing 
quality (through the heterogeneous price coefficient), idiosyncratic locational preferences (through the logit 
error), and heterogeneous preferences for neighborhood attributes and sociodemographic characteristics.  
Also, as discussed above, we do not adjust crime rates and school quality with changing neighborhood 
compositions in the simulations, viewing this as a conservative approach to estimating the extent to which   26 
 
generally, it indicates that income and education stratification do not work in an exactly co-linear 
way.   
    Turning to racial segregation (see Table 9), there is a general tendency for the experiment 
to increase own-race segregation, as with the commuting cost experiments.  What is noticeable is 
the heterogeneity in the strength of the segregation effect looking at different races.  For whites 
and ‘other’ racial groups, the magnitude of the changes is very much in line with those in the first 
commuting  experiment,  which  halved  the  disutility  of  commutes,  while  for  blacks,  the 
segregation  effects  are  altogether  much  stronger.    This  clearly  indicates  that  differential 
preferences for housing attributes by race serve to integrate different racial groups, but especially 
so for blacks. 
Consumption.  When  we  look  at  the  effects  of  the  housing  experiment  on  consumption, 
switching off housing tastes leads, as one would anticipate, to a partial equalization of housing 
consumption (see panel (5) of Tables 10, 11, and 12), especially on the basis of income and 
comparing blacks versus whites.  Similarly, there is a narrowing in the consumption of local 
amenities, with the gaps in the consumption of school quality and crime declining somewhat, 
especially across income quartiles. 
 
Counterfactual Simulations – Commuting and Housing Combined   
    As  a  final  experiment,  we  explore  the  consequences  of  switching  off  commuting 
preferences and preferences over housing at the same time.  In terms of education stratification, 
the individual experiments are mutually reinforcing, as is apparent from panel (5) of Table 7; the 
combined experiment gives rise to the highest levels of education segregation relative to the pre-
experiment  benchmark.    Even  so,  despite  the  radical  nature  of  the  experiment,  education 
stratification is still far from complete: highly educated households still live in neighborhoods 
that also contain over 16 percent of households, on average, with no more than a high school 
education;  and  households  in  the  bottom  education  category  live  in  neighborhoods  with  21 
percent of households who are highly educated.  A roughly similar pattern is evident in terms of 
race – see panel (5) in Table 9 – with the combined experiment giving rise to a compounding 
effect on own-race segregation.     
    Consistent  with  the  results  from  the  housing  experiment,  the  net  effect  on  income 
segregation  from  the  combined  experiment  (see  panel  (5)  of  Table  8)  looks  remarkably  like 
income segregation in the pre-experiment simulations, implying that the two experiments are 
almost entirely offsetting. 
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7     CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we used a counterfactual equilibrium approach to shed new light on factors that 
may contribute to the widespread sociodemographic mixing observed in US cities.  Generally 
speaking, the approach we use allows us to change the primitives of an econometric sorting 
model, estimated using rich Census data, and then compute the implied stratification associated 
with counterfactual equilibria that arise. 
    Our  first  simulations  explored  the  role  of  changing  the  disutility  of  commutes o n  
residential mixing counterfactually.  The benchmark Tiebout model abstracts from employment 
considerations,  yet  commuting  to  work  is  often  costly  and  the  location  of  the  workplace  is 
typically  an  important  influence  on  households’ c h o i c e  o f  r e s i d e n c e .   Thus  counterfactual 
reductions in the disutility associated with commuting should help gauge how much this factor 
contributes to observed stratification.  We find that as commuting matters less (counterfactually) 
to households, so residential stratification at the census block level increases markedly, especially 
on the basis of education and race.  This makes clear that in practice, employment geography and 
non-trivial  commuting  costs  serve  to  bring  heterogeneous  households  together  in  the  same 
residential neighborhoods.  As has been noted by Oates and Schwab (1988), among others, firm 
production typically requires complementary labor inputs, combining low and high skill workers 
and, consistent with our findings, this serves as an integrating force.  Never-the-less, even when 
commuting considerations are switched off entirely, a fairly high degree of residential mixing on 
the basis of education, income and race persists.  When we look at the implied consumption of 
amenities, our results suggest – as is plausible – that as distance to work matters relatively less 
than other considerations in the household location choice, so stratification on the basis of local 
public goods consumption increases: highly educated households tend to locate in neighborhoods 
with better schools and lower crime than in the benchmark pre-experiment equilibrium, while the 
reverse is true for less-educated households, for example. 
    Examining the separate contribution of heterogeneous tastes for housing, our findings 
point to an interesting contrast: while switching off tastes for housing leads to quite marked 
increases in racial and education stratification, income stratification declines, drawing attention to 
the  way t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  h o u s i n g  ( w i t h  l a r g e r  h o u s e s  being  found  in  more  affluent 
neighborhoods)  serves  to  segregate  households  on  the  basis  of  income.    When  housing 
characteristics  cease  to  matter  directly  in  the  household  location  decision,  we  see  some   28 
 
equalization  in  the  consumption  of  amenities  (in  addition  to  the  predictable e q u a l i z a t i o n  i n  
housing consumption).    
    It is worth noting that our static approach takes as given the distribution of employment 
and the characteristics of housing.  In terms of the former, research by Anas (see, for instance, 
Anas (1982)) has sought to endogenize firm locations, and one could also allow households to 
make  joint  residential  and  employment  choices.    Both  types  of  extension  are  technically 
challenging.  Recent research has also sought to endogenized housing supply, Murphy (2011) 
being an excellent example.  Estimable dynamic equilibrium models that incorporate housing and 
that are amenable to counterfactual analysis are highly appealing; as yet, they remain beyond the 
frontier of current research.     
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Observations 27,548 13,612 13,936
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Mean S.D. Mean Mean Mean ((4) - (5)) t-statistic
Housing Prices
House value (if owned) 297,700 178,479 250,005 259,475 240,756 18,719 4.15
Monthly rent (if rented) 744 316 678 688 669 18.80 1.73
School Quality
Average test score 527 74 507 544 471 74 25.44
Housing Characteristics
1 if unit owned 0.60 0.49 0.54 0.55 0.53 0.02 0.89
Number of rooms 5.11 1.99 4.96 5.02 4.90 0.12 1.56
1 if built in 1980s 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.00 -0.31
1 if built in 1960s or 1970s 0.39 0.49 0.34 0.35 0.33 0.01 0.84
Elevation 210 179 176 178 173 6 1.64
Population density 0.43 0.50 0.39 0.38 0.40 -0.02 -1.38
Neighborhood Sociodemographics
% Census block group white 0.68 0.23 0.61 0.63 0.60 0.03 3.40
% Census block group black 0.08 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.20 -0.03 -3.15
% Census block group coll deg or more 0.44 0.20 0.41 0.44 0.39 0.05 6.18
Average block group income 54,742 26,075 46,271 47,718 44,857 2,861 2.61
Note: This table reports summary statistics for the key variables included in the analysis. The boundary sample includes all houses located within 0.20 miles of a
boundary with another school attendance zone. A house is considered to be on the 'high' ('low') side of a boundary if the test score at its local school is greater
(less) than the corresponding test score for the closest house on the opposite side of an attendance zone boundary. Sample statistics are reported for the high- and
low-side of boundaries for which the test score gap is in excess of the median gap (38.4 points) in columns (4) and (5), respectively. Column (7) reports the t-
statistic for a test of the hypothesis that the mean of the variable listed in the row heading does not vary across school attendance zone boundaries. This test
conditions on boundary fixed effects (so as to compare houses on opposite sides of the same boundary) and adjusts for the clustering of observations at the Census
block group level.     
Table 1. Sample Statistics Comparing the Full Sample with Houses within 0.20 miles of a Boundary








Average Test Score (in standard deviations)
% Neighborhood Black 
% Neighborhood Hispanic
% Neighborhood Asian
% Neighborhood College Degree or more
Average Neighborhood Income (/10000)
Distance to Work
Note: All regressions shown in the table also include controls for whether house was built in 1960-1979, elevation, population
density, crime, land use (% industrial, % residential, % commercial, % open space, % other) in 1, 2 and 3 mile rings around
each location. The dependent variable is the monthly user cost of housing, which equals monthly rent for renter-occupied units
and a monthly user cost for owner-occupied housing, calculated as described in the text. Standard errors corrected for

























Table 2: Delta Regressions - Implied Mean Willingness to Pay
Within 0.20 Miles of BoundaryOwn vs. Rent +1 Room Built in 1980s +10% Black vs. +10% Hisp vs. +10% Asian vs. +10% College Blk Group Average
vs. pre-1960 White White White Educated Avg Income Test Score
+ $10,000 +1 s.d.
Mean MWTP 51.0 91.5 95.4 -10.5 -0.4 -0.5 10.5 36.3 19.7
(6.1) (13.9) (15.1) (3.7) (3.1) (3.2) (3.2) (6.6) (7.4)
Household Income (+$10,000) 21.7 4.8 9.3 -1.2 0.8 0.1 1.4 0.9 1.4
(0.7) (0.2) (0.8) (0.4) (0.4) (0.3) (0.2) (0.1) (0.3)
Children Under 18 vs. -13.3 37.5 -26.0 11.9 17.2 12.6 -16.1 2.4 7.4
No Children (7.0) (1.8) (8.5) (3.0) (3.3) (2.7) (2.2) (1.2) (3.6)
Black vs. White -67.7 3.8 5.4 98.3 46.7 48.3 18.4 -1.2 -14.3
(13.0) (3.5) (17.4) (3.9) (5.6) (5.1) (4.5) (2.2) (7.4)
Hispanic vs. White -8.2 -14.5 -6.3 30.9 85.6 18.0 6.3 1.1 -4.1
(10.1) (2.7) (12.2) (3.9) (4.0) (4.2) (3.4) (1.4) (6.0)
Asian vs. White 113.5 -22.1 43.9 28.1 22.3 95.2 0.4 0.7 7.0
(9.6) (2.2) (11.3) (3.8) (4.4) (3.5) (2.6) (1.5) (5.5)
College Degree or More vs. 37.6 -0.6 40.2 9.2 -4.6 -13.4 58.0 0.3 13.0
Some College or Less (8.1) (2.2) (9.7) (3.1) (3.9) (3.0) (2.3) (1.4) (3.6)
Note: The first row of the table reports the mean marginal willingness-to-pay for the change reported in the column heading. The remaining rows report the difference in willingness to pay associated with the change
listed in the row heading, holding all other factors equal. The full heterogeneous choice model includes 135 interactions between nine household characteristics and fifteen housing and neighborhood characteristics. The
included household characteristics are household income, the presence of children under 18, and the race/ethnicity (Asian, black, Hispanic, white), educational attainment (some college, college degree or more), work
status, and age of the household head. The housing and neighborhood characteristics are the monthly user cost of housing, distance to work, average test score, whether the house is owner-occupied, number of rooms, year
built (1980s, 1960-1979, pre-1960), elevation, population density, crime, and the racial composition (% Asian, % black, % Hispanic, % white) and average education (% college degree) and household income for the
corresponding Census block group. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
Table 3. Heterogeneity in Marginal Willingness to Pay for Housing and Neighborhood Characteristics
House Characteristics Neighborhood CharacteristicsSample Exposure Rates Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
Neighborhood percent ! High school  0.431 0.341 0.266
Neighborhood percent with Some college 0.225 0.235 0.216
Neighborhood percent " College degree 0.344 0.424 0.518
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000
Sample Education Distribution
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
0.338 0.223 0.438
Pre-experiment Simulation Exposure Rates
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
Neighborhood percent ! High school  0.449 0.367 0.238
Neighborhood percent with Some college 0.243 0.245 0.198
Neighborhood percent " College degree 0.308 0.388 0.564
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes:
Neighborhoods are defined at the block group level.
Table 4: Education Exposure Rates - Sample and Pre-Experiment
Each column gives the average exposure of households whose type is given by the relevant column heading to 
neighbors in the row category.Sample Exposure Rates
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 1 0.351 0.271 0.218 0.164
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 2 0.268 0.271 0.250 0.206
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 3 0.217 0.252 0.273 0.258
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 4 0.163 0.207 0.258 0.372
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Pre-experiment Simulation Exposure Rates
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 1 0.319 0.278 0.239 0.169
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 2 0.275 0.265 0.249 0.206
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 3 0.238 0.250 0.257 0.256
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 4 0.168 0.207 0.255 0.369
1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes
Neighborhoods are defined at the block group level.
Each column gives the average exposure of households whose type is given by the relevant column heading to 
neighbors in the row category.
Table 5: Income Exposure Rates - Sample and Pre-experiment
Household Income
Household IncomeSample Exposure Rates Household Race
White Black Other
Neighborhood percent White 0.760 0.377 0.571
Neighborhood percent Black 0.042 0.384 0.076
Neighborhood percent Other 0.198 0.239 0.353





Pre-experiment Simulation Exposure Rates
Household Race
White Black Other
Neighborhood percent White 0.847 0.290 0.349
Neighborhood percent Black 0.032 0.421 0.092
Neighborhood percent Other 0.121 0.289 0.559
Total 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes:
"Household race" is taken to be the race of the householder. 
The three race categories are defined to be exclusive and exhaustive.
Neighborhoods are defined at the block group level.
Each column gives the average exposure of households whose type is given by the relevant column heading to 
neighbors in the row category.
Table 6: Race Exposure Rates - Sample and Pre-Experiment(1) Pre-experiment
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
Neighborhood percent ! High school  0.449 0.367 0.238
Neighborhood percent with Some college 0.243 0.245 0.198
Neighborhood percent " College degree 0.308 0.388 0.564
(2) Counterfactual: cut disutility of commutes in half 
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
Neighborhood percent ! High school  0.485 0.392 0.197
Neighborhood percent with Some college 0.259 0.259 0.178
Neighborhood percent " College degree 0.256 0.349 0.624
(3) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes 
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
Neighborhood percent ! High school  0.503 0.410 0.174
Neighborhood percent with Some college 0.271 0.273 0.161
Neighborhood percent " College degree 0.226 0.316 0.664
(4) Counterfactual: switch off housing preferences 
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
Neighborhood percent ! High school  0.478 0.396 0.202
Neighborhood percent with Some college 0.261 0.261 0.175
Neighborhood percent " College degree 0.261 0.344 0.623
(5) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes and housing preferences
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
Neighborhood percent ! High school  0.507 0.428 0.162
Neighborhood percent with Some college 0.282 0.288 0.145
Neighborhood percent " College degree 0.210 0.285 0.693
Notes:
All the columns sum to 1.
Neighborhoods are defined at the block group level.
Table 7: Education Exposure Rates - Simulation Results
Each column gives the average exposure of households whose type is given by the relevant column heading to 
neighbors in the row category.(1) Pre-experiment
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 1 0.319 0.278 0.239 0.169
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 2 0.275 0.265 0.249 0.206
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 3 0.238 0.250 0.257 0.256
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 4 0.168 0.207 0.255 0.369
(2) Counterfactual: cut disutility of commutes in half 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 1 0.326 0.281 0.238 0.159
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 2 0.278 0.268 0.250 0.199
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 3 0.237 0.251 0.260 0.253
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 4 0.158 0.199 0.253 0.389
(3) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 1 0.332 0.282 0.237 0.154
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 2 0.279 0.269 0.250 0.196
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 3 0.236 0.252 0.261 0.253
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 4 0.153 0.197 0.252 0.397
(4) Counterfactual: switch off housing preferences 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 1 0.306 0.270 0.242 0.187
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 2 0.267 0.259 0.249 0.220
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 3 0.241 0.250 0.256 0.254
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 4 0.186 0.220 0.254 0.339
(5) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes and housing preferences
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 1 0.314 0.274 0.242 0.175
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 2 0.271 0.263 0.251 0.211
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 3 0.241 0.252 0.257 0.251
Neighborhood percent Income Quartile 4 0.174 0.211 0.250 0.364
Notes
All the columns sum to 1.
Neighborhoods are defined at the block group level.
Table 8: Income Exposure Rates - Simulation results
Household Income
Household Income
Each column gives the average exposure of households whose type is given by the relevant column heading to 






Neighborhood percent White 0.847 0.290 0.349
Neighborhood percent Black 0.032 0.421 0.092
Neighborhood percent Other 0.121 0.289 0.559
(2) Counterfactual: cut disutility of commutes in half 
Household Race
White Black Other
Neighborhood percent White 0.868 0.263 0.299
Neighborhood percent Black 0.029 0.460 0.088
Neighborhood percent Other 0.103 0.277 0.613
(3) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes 
Household Race
White Black Other
Neighborhood percent White 0.882 0.243 0.263
Neighborhood percent Black 0.027 0.464 0.093
Neighborhood percent Other 0.091 0.293 0.644
(4) Counterfactual: switch off housing preferences 
Household Race
White Black Other
Neighborhood percent White 0.870 0.253 0.296
Neighborhood percent Black 0.028 0.482 0.084
Neighborhood percent Other 0.103 0.265 0.620
(5) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes and housing preferences
Household Race
White Black Other
Neighborhood percent White 0.902 0.208 0.217
Neighborhood percent Black 0.023 0.526 0.084
Neighborhood percent Other 0.075 0.266 0.699
Notes:
All the columns sum to 1.
Neighborhoods are defined at the block group level.
Table 9: Race Exposure Rates - Simulation Results
Each column gives the average exposure of households whose type is given by the relevant column heading to 
neighbors in the row category.(1) Sample
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
ownership rate 0.549 0.555 0.655
number of rooms 4.7 5.0 5.5
school test score 504.7 525.5 546.8




! High school  Some college " College degree
ownership rate 0.547 0.561 0.653
number of rooms 4.73 5.10 5.42
school test score 508.54 529.60 541.77
crime rate 9.75 7.16 7.50
(3) Counterfactual: cut disutility of commutes in half 
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
ownership rate 0.552 0.562 0.649
number of rooms 4.70 5.08 5.45
school test score 504.79 527.94 545.42
crime rate 10.96 7.44 6.42
(4) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes 
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
ownership rate 0.550 0.564 0.650
number of rooms 4.69 5.09 5.45
school test score 504.41 527.74 545.92
crime rate 11.49 7.65 5.89
(5) Counterfactual: switch off housing preferences 
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
ownership rate 0.579 0.616 0.601
number of rooms 4.91 5.21 5.23
school test score 510.89 529.91 539.84
crime rate 9.38 6.97 7.86
(6) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes and housing preferences
Household Education Level
! High school  Some college " College degree
ownership rate 0.534 0.604 0.642
number of rooms 4.70 5.14 5.42
school test score 505.73 527.56 544.96
crime rate 11.10 7.43 6.33
Table 10: Consumption Rates by Education Category
Note: Table gives average consumption levels of the row characteristic for households in the 
column heading category.(1) Sample
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
ownership rate 0.373 0.499 0.671 0.847
number of rooms 3.9 4.6 5.4 6.5
school test score 504.2 518.5 530.0 558.6
crime rate 12.4 8.6 6.7 5.0
Simulation results
(2) Pre-experiment
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
ownership rate 0.420 0.491 0.625 0.852
number of rooms 4.21 4.62 5.24 6.38
school test score 506.43 518.09 530.09 556.69
crime rate 11.52 9.09 7.19 4.93
(3) Counterfactual: cut disutility of commutes in half 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
ownership rate 0.416 0.485 0.625 0.862
number of rooms 4.18 4.59 5.24 6.45
school test score 505.32 517.29 529.91 558.63
crime rate 12.09 9.14 7.05 4.45
(4) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
ownership rate 0.410 0.483 0.627 0.867
number of rooms 4.16 4.59 5.24 6.48
school test score 505.08 517.57 530.23 558.45
crime rate 12.39 9.12 6.92 4.29
(5) Counterfactual: switch off housing preferences 
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
ownership rate 0.539 0.568 0.603 0.679
number of rooms 4.72 4.91 5.15 5.68
school test score 508.86 519.99 530.15 552.37
crime rate 10.56 8.66 7.44 6.04
(6) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes and housing preferences
Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
ownership rate 0.510 0.559 0.604 0.716
number of rooms 4.57 4.85 5.15 5.88
school test score 506.59 518.52 529.62 556.53
crime rate 11.59 8.77 7.23 5.16




Note: Table gives average consumption levels of the row characteristic for households in 






ownership rate 0.639 0.402 0.539
number of rooms 5.37 4.57 4.55
school test score 541.5 466.3 507.9





ownership rate 0.636 0.388 0.552
number of rooms 5.33 4.45 4.69
school test score 538.60 473.99 513.81
crime rate 6.80 17.71 9.14
(3) Counterfactual: cut disutility of commutes in half 
Household Race
White Black Other
ownership rate 0.627 0.424 0.565
number of rooms 5.32 4.57 4.68
school test score 540.70 468.46 509.34
crime rate 6.40 17.19 10.47
(4) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes 
Household Race
White Black Other
ownership rate 0.624 0.424 0.574
number of rooms 5.31 4.55 4.72
school test score 541.75 467.07 506.93
crime rate 6.42 16.95 10.48
(5) Counterfactual: switch off housing preferences 
Household Race
White Black Other
ownership rate 0.590 0.570 0.626
number of rooms 5.10 4.86 5.24
school test score 536.59 467.68 521.68
crime rate 7.05 16.75 8.70
(6) Counterfactual: switch off disutility of commutes and housing preferences
Household Race
! High school  Some college " College degree
ownership rate 0.604 0.548 0.592
number of rooms 5.18 4.74 5.06
school test score 540.73 463.20 511.05
crime rate 6.48 17.72 10.10
Table 12: Consumption Rates by Racial Group
Note: Table gives average consumption levels of the row characteristic for households in the 
column heading category.